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ABSTRACT
Until the December 2016 passage of the Cures Act, the FDA had regu-
latory power over clinical decision support (CDS) software; however,
the Act removed a large group of CDS software from the FDA’s statu-
tory authority. Congressional intent was to increase innovation by re-
moving regulatory blockades—such as device testing and
certification—from the FDA’s purview. This note argues that the enact-
ment of this specific provision of the Act will instead stymie innovation
and overlook the unfortunate safety consequences inherent in its der-
egulation. CDS software is a burgeoning field ripe for innovation;
however, rapid innovation can often lead to a slew of mistakes—mis-
takes in software coding, mistakes in software implementation, and
even mistakes in software design. This note considers the issues with
deregulating CDS software, focusing on the health and safety concerns,
as well as the lack of incentive for software creators to share algo-
rithms. This note then proposes other, less-invasive regimes for CDS
software regulation to address these problems.
INTRODUCTION
In December 2016, Congress passed, and the President signed into law,
the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act).1  While the Cures Act has a range
of provisions targeting FDA review and approval of both drugs and medical
devices, this Note focuses on Section 3060, titled ‘Clarifying Medical
Software Regulation.’2  Until the passage of the Cures Act, the FDA had
1. Katie Reilly, Watch Live: President Obama Signs the 21st Century Cures Act, TIME
MAGAZINE (Dec 13, 2016), http://time.com/4599295/president-obama-cures-act-livestream-on-
line/.
2. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No.114-255, 130 Stat. 1034, 1130-33 (2016).
115
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assumed regulatory power over clinical decision support (CDS) software
under the FDA’s jurisdiction over medical devices.3  CDS software includes
software with big data algorithms used to direct physicians to tailored treat-
ment options and verify drug-drug and patient-drug reactions.  The Cures
Act removes a large group of CDS software from the statutory definition of
‘device,’ thus removing CDS software from the FDA’s jurisdiction.4  By
removing such critical technology from FDA regulation, Congress intended
to increase innovation by removing regulatory blockades; however, this
Note argues that Congress’ enactment of the Cures Act has instead both
stymied innovation and overlooked the safety consequences inherent in its
deregulation.
Part I of this Note explores the history of CDS software, explaining
what CDS software is and how the FDA has regulated such software in the
past.  Part II looks at the changes to CDS software regulation under the 21st
Century Cures Act.  Part II also considers the rationales behind deregulating
CDS software and why the Cures Act, specifically the CDS provision, was
passed without much resistance.  Part III considers two major issues with
deregulating CDS software and removing it from the FDA’s regulation.  Part
III initially analyzes the health and safety concerns surrounding the use of
CDS software, especially concerns related to human error and alert fatigue.
Then, Part III looks at the lack of incentive for software creators to share
algorithms, especially without FDA regulation. Part IV argues that FDA reg-
ulation involving minimum safety standards for CDS and a pre-approval re-
gime of regulatory exclusivity would be a better option to address public
health concerns and to ensure ongoing innovation.
I. CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE: A DISCUSSION
OF PAST REGULATION
Clinical decision support software (CDS) refers to electronic technology
used to enhance clinical decision-making.5  CDS combines electronic health
records, e-prescribing systems, computerized physician order entry, medica-
tion reconciliation systems, and symptom trackers to help clinicians in their
work.6  CDS can help a clinician “reach proper diagnoses, ask the right ques-
tions, and perform appropriate tests on the front end of the decision-making
process—preventing errors of omission—as well as stop errors of commis-
3. Greg Slabodkin, 21st Century Cures Act clarifies FDA regulation of software,
HEALTH DATA MANAGEMENT (Dec. 5, 2016, 6:57 AM), https://www.healthdatamanagement
.com/news/21st-century-cures-act-clarifies-fda-regulation-of-software.
4. 21st Century Cures Act § 3060(a)(1).
5. Clinical Decision Support (CDS), HEALTHIT.GOV, https://www.healthit.gov/policy-
researchers-implementers/clinical-decision-support-cds (last visited Dec 13, 2016).
6. See generally Id.
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sion on the back end, during treatment and procedures.”7  CDS proponents
describe CDS as a process for enhancing a physician’s health-related deci-
sions with pertinent, organized clinical knowledge and patient information to
improve health and healthcare delivery.8
CDS can take multiple forms.  The most common is a computerized,
physician-ordered entry system (a typical database entry system used by
hospitals) with an integrated CDS as an electronic layer of review.9  This
layer frequently supports physicians in the process of ordering prescriptions
by alerting physicians to any critical drug-patient and drug-drug interac-
tions.10  Ordered entry systems, like UpToDate, not only aggregate and re-
port the latest research, but they also synthesize the evidence and provide
point-of-care recommendations.11  This basic form of CDS software pro-
vides alerts to clinicians as they refill prescriptions and can remind clinicians
to alter or update drug dosages, change the timing for administering
medicine, and provides alternative options if a certain drug is not working.
There are more advanced forms of CDS that go beyond the basic alerts
found in UpToDate and other prescription-based CDS systems.  For exam-
ple, the Clinical Assistant by Grand Round Table combines electronic health
records with big data analysis on a personalized, individual basis.12  The
Clinical Assistant “uses the information the clinicians have already entered
about their patients . . . and [the patients’] test results to generate a deidenti-
fied clinical profile.  The Clinical Assistant then delivers distilled in-
sights. . .by pattern matching that profile against a database of millions of
evidence-based clinical resources.”13  This system fuses the practices of
CDS software with what is called black-box personalized medicine. Black-
box medicine combines the use of big data and machine-learning algorithms
to create predictive correlations.14  Doctors have recognized that because pa-
7. 10 Innovative Clinical Decision Support Programs, INFORMATIONWEEK HEALTH-
CARE, http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/clinical-information-systems/10-innova-
tive-clinical-decision-support-programs/d/d-id/1101834? (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
8. Clinical Decision Support, HEALTHCARE INFORMATION AND MANAGEMENT SYS-
TEMS SOCIETY, http://www.himss.org/library/clinical-decision-support (last visited Dec 14,
2016).
9. Michael Greenberg & M. Susan Ridgely, Clinical Decision Support and Malprac-
tice Risk, 306 JAMA 90–91, 90-91 (2011), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-ab-
stract/1104038 (last visited Dec 14, 2016).
10. Id.
11. Wolters Kluwer, Product, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/home/product (last
visited Dec 16, 2016).
12. GRAND ROUND TABLE, A BIG DATA APPROACH TO CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT, 2-
3, 2014, http://www.grandroundtable.com/pdf/GrandRoundTable_ClinicalAssistant.pdf.
13. Id. at 3.
14. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015)
(defining the concept of black-box medicine and how it has changed the healthcare landscape);
see also Ruben Amarasingham et al., Implementing Electronic Health Care Predictive Analyt-
ics: Considerations And Challenges, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1148, 1148 (2014) (describing the use of
big-data in healthcare through prediction technology).
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tients are different from each other, tailored treatment is more likely to be
effective.  This type of CDS software is not as prevalent in hospitals yet
because black-box algorithms need to be tested and validated, meaning only
large providers have sufficient datasets available for use.  The results of a
machine-learning algorithm may be accurate given enough data; however,
because a scientist is unlikely to understand what specific factors can alter
an algorithm to what extent, clinicians currently do not implement algo-
rithms through the use of black-box software outside of a few larger health-
care providers.
Even though this type of CDS software is not prevalent in hospitals yet,
these connections are likely “to yield new diagnostic tests and treatments
and to enable individually tailored medical decisions.”15  Black-box algo-
rithms can answer questions about how best to treat a particular patient or
even diagnose a specific ailment.16  Most importantly, advanced and person-
alized CDS software can cut down healthcare costs in terms of both time and
money, saving lives and ensuring effective resource allocation.  As Congress
has recognized in its passage of the 21st Century Cures Act, encouraging the
use of CDS software and black-box algorithms is a necessary part of advanc-
ing the medical field; however, the Congressional method of incentivizing
such innovation does the opposite while jeopardizing patient safety at the
same time.
As will be discussed below, CDS software, while effective, can cause
problems if used in a negligent manner or without adequate data.  This pol-
icy rationale alone may suffice for why the FDA may want to regulate CDS
software; however, even if it does not, there are also statuary obligations
under which the FDA already has the authority to regulate such software.
Section 321(h) defines a medical device as “an instrument, apparatus, imple-
ment, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or
related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is: . . .
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”17  According to the FDA,
and under statutory analysis of the section above, CDS software falls under
that definition and thus, under the FDA’s jurisdiction.18
In 1986, the House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight held
hearings on the use of advanced computer systems in medical care.  The
15. Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson Price, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box
Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016).
16. See, e.g., Steven I. Sherman et al., Augmenting pre-operative risk of recurrence
stratification in differentiated thyroid carcinoma using machine learning and high dimensional
transcriptional data from thyroid FNA, 33 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 6044 (2015) (reporting
about a study successfully using machine learning to classify thyroid cancer tumors).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).
18. JOHN F. MURRAY, CDRH REGULATED SOFTWARE: AN INTRODUCTION, http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Training/CDRHLearn/UCM209129.pdf (last visited Dec 16, 2016).
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FDA submitted an unsigned statement regarding its jurisdiction, noting that
“[m]edical software products that are marketed separately from a computer
(generally referred to as stand alone software) and used with a computer to
form a system which operates as a medical device will be treated as a medi-
cal device.”19  In 1989, the FDA published a draft guidance document that
explained how the FDA planned to determine whether a computer-based
product is a medical device and how the FDA intended to regulate such
devices.20  That policy was withdrawn in 2005 when the FDA determined
that the current structure of the  policy was impractical and that its regula-
tory approach should focus on the harm the specific device poses to patients,
regardless of whether the device uses software or not.21 The FDA realized
that harm was a more accurate measure in determining what restrictions it
should place on the development and use of a medical device.  Determina-
tions based on the type of device would not accurately determine what dan-
gers the FDA needed to address with each device.  Until recently, the Center
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), the offshoot of the FDA that
focuses on medical devices, has addressed each situation on a case-by-case
basis.22
The FDA stated, as early as 1986 and into 2011, that treatment recom-
mendation and support software fall into the category of medical devices.23
21 CFR 820, regulating the quality of software systems governed under
‘medical device,’ requires that all software meet minimum design and
purchasing control standards, regardless of what the software’s device Class
actually is.24  Then, based on the use of the medical device, regulation for
software as a medical device (SaMD) differs by class, as proposed in the
figure below.25
19. Vincent Brannigan, The Regulation of Medical Expert Computer Software as a De-
vice Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 370, 370 (1987).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 21 C.F.R. § 820. The FDA uses a tiered, Class system to determine what level of
regulation is necessary for any particular device. There are three Classes, with Class 1 refer-
ring to devices that do not need much regulatory oversight (e.g., Band-Aids) and Class 3
referring to devices that need much more oversight (e.g., robot-assisted surgical devices).
25. Software as a Medical Device (SaMD): Clinical Evaluation, Food & Drug Admin.
(2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/UCM524904.pdf.
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FIGURE 1. CATEGORIES OF SOFTWARE AS MEDICAL DEVICES
Some commentators have argued that the function of CDS software is
“to support the clinical judgment of a healthcare professional, not to replace
it,” and therefore it should not be regulated by the FDA.  The FDA caused
even more confusion by saying that they would regulate high-risk CDS but
not low-risk software, without providing any indication of what would con-
stitute high or low risk.26  The CDS coalition, a group of CDS developers
and manufacturers, recently released a white paper asking the FDA to clarify
the scope of CDS regulation and the requirements of any such regulation.27
The paper stated that “until the regulatory playing field for CDS software is
better defined, it is likely that powerful and potentially life-saving CDS tools
will be kept out of clinicians’ and patients’ hands.”28  In the past, CDS de-
velopers have run into problems deciding what class their software falls into
or at the least, what class the FDA will choose for their software.  For that
reason, CDS developers have asked for clarification for many years; how-
ever, the FDA has generally only given vague guidance documents about the
regulation of CDS software.  As a response to some of this confusion regard-
ing what the FDA does or does not regulate, Congress passed the 21st Cen-
tury Cures Act, entirely changing the FDA’s jurisdiction over medical
software.
II. THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT AND THE DEREGULATION OF CLINICAL
DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE
On December 13, 2016, President Obama signed into law the 21st Cen-
tury Cures Act, which Congress passed with overwhelming support.29  The
stated purpose of the Act was to “advance medical product innovation and
26. Greg Slabodkin, 21st Century Cures Act clarifies FDA regulation of software,
HEALTHDATA MANAGEMENT (2016) http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/21st-cen-
tury-cures-act-clarifies-fda-regulation-of-software (last visited Dec 5, 2016).
27. CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT COALITION, WEIGHING THE IMPACT OF FDA REGULA-
TORY UNCERTAINTY ON CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (2016), http://cd-
scoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CDS-Survey-White-Paper-Final-2016.pdf.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Katie Reilly, President Obama Signs the 21st Century Cures Act, TIME (Dec. 13,
2016), http://time.com/4599295/president-obama-cures-act-livestream-online/.
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ensure that patients get access to treatments as quickly as possible, with
continued assurance from high quality evidence that they are safe and effec-
tive.”30  The Act addressed many of the trickier issues the FDA dealt with in
the last few years, including how to regulate medical software that qualifies
as a medical device.31  The Act removed five categories of software from the
definition of medical device, and thus from the FDA’s jurisdiction. Specifi-
cally § 3060(a) states that:
[T]he Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360j) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
The term device, as defined in section 201(h), shall not include
a software functioning that is intended –. . .for the purpose of –
(i) displaying, analyzing, or printing medical information about
a patient or other medical information (such as peer reviewed
clinical studies and clinical practice guidelines); (ii) SUPPORT-
ING OR PROVIDING RECOMMENDATIONS TO A HEALTH CARE PRO-
FESSIONAL ABOUT PREVENTION, DIAGNOSIS, OR TREATMENT OF A
DISEASE OR CONDITION; AND (iii) ENABLING SUCH HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONAL TO INDEPENDENTLY REVIEW THE BASIS FOR SUCH
RECOMMENDATIONS that such software presents so that it is not
the intent that such health care professional rely primarily on
any such recommendation to make a clinical diagnosis or treat-
ment decision regarding an individual patient.32
Under this provision, the FDA will not regulate software using big data
or clinical-trial aggregation to provide clinical decision support to healthcare
professionals if such software allows health professionals to independently
review the basis.33  Although, some FDA policies have already exempted
portions of software (although not explicitly CDS) from regulation, the
above language codifies limitations on enforcement to some degree.34
To be clear, this section does have a few exceptions as it allows for
some level of FDA guidance and regulation.  First, image analysis software
and in vitro diagnostic software will continue to fall under the definition of
‘medical device,’ and the FDA will continue to have full jurisdiction over
30. Robert M. Califf, 21st Century Cures Act: Making Progress on Shared Goals for
Patients, FDA VOICE, Dec. 13, 2016, https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2016/12/21st-
century-cures-act-making-progress-on-shared-goals-for-patients/.
31. Sarah Faulkner, How the 21st Century Cures Act Will Affect Medical Devices,
MASSDEVICE (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.massdevice.com/21st-century-cures-act-will-affect-
medical-devices/.
32. 21st Century Cures Act § 3060(a) (emphasis added).
33. See id.
34. Michele L. Buenafe & M. Elizabeth Bierman, 21st Century Cures Act and Its Effect
on Digital Health, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/21st-
century-cures-act-and-its-effect-digital-health (last visited Dec. 11, 2016).
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those softwares.35  Second, CDS software may still be considered a ‘medical
device’ if it “would be reasonably likely to have serious adverse health con-
sequences.”36  For any software that is likely to have serious consequences,
developers may still have to refer to past FDA enforcement decisions and
discretionary policy to understand the scope and effect of regulation.37
III. THE COSTS OF DEREGULATION: THE IMPACT ON PUBLIC SAFETY
AND INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION
A. Lack of Regulation as a Public Health Concern
The 21st Century Cures Act, while attempting to loosen regulation on
software, has overlooked many of the reasons the FDA may have regulated
software as a medical device.  There are two major public health issues with
the unregulated use of CDS, especially CDS software that is dependent on
big data and black-box algorithms. This section on public health and safety
concerns will first consider the CDS issue of ‘alert fatigue’ and then the
issue of algorithm validation.
Basic types of clinical decision support software, such as those tied to
prescription-related concerns, use automated warnings to alert clinicians
about possible complications.  These complications can arise as possible
drug interactions with other drugs or can be specific to a patient’s individual
allergies or dosage issues.  However, multiple studies show that CDS
software may often cause more human error through an overabundance of
alerts—a concept known as alert fatigue.38  Because many CDS developers
over-include which warnings a system will automatically generate, physi-
cians using the system have a high rate of “alert fatigue, . . . undermin[ing]
the utility the systems offer.”39  For example, some systems trigger a “medi-
cation interaction alert” when one of the prescriptions is a topical salve a
nurse should apply but could be problematic if the patient ingested the drug
in large amounts.40  Because of these type of warnings—warnings that are
35. 21st Century Cures Act § 3060(a)(1).
36. Id. at § 3060(a)(3)(A).
37. See id. (meaning FDA guidance will also be necessary to understand what consti-
tutes a reasonable likelihood of ‘serious adverse health consequences.’).
38. Michael Greenberg & M. Susan Ridgely, Clinical Decision Support and Malprac-
tice Risk, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 90–91 (2011), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-
abstract/1104038 (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
39. Id.
40. Aaron S Kesselheim et al., Clinical Decision Support Systems Could Be Modified
To Reduce ‘Alert Fatigue’ While Still Minimizing The Risk Of Litigation, 30 HEALTH AFF.
2310 (2011) (citing Gilad J. Kuperman et al., Medication-related Clinical Decision Support in
Computerized Provider Order Entry Systems: A Review, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N
29 (2007)).
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less than useful—physicians ignore 49-96 percent of all alerts.41 Studies
show that physicians consistently miss or ignore useful alerts, studies that
have been confirmed by this author’s personal research with individual prac-
titioners regarding the rate at which they read CDS alerts versus what they
ignore.42
Without regulation from the FDA, there are no requirements for what
kind of alerts and how many alerts a specific CDS system should use.
Software creators are worried about liability; without guidance on what
alerts are actually helpful, creators are more inclined to just include every
warning possible without regard for its utility.  FDA requirements might
help set a standard for what type of alerts are helpful and necessary.  There
is also no metric to determine whether software is more harmful to patients
when alert fatigue is taken into account.  Alert fatigue is not just a problem
for basic CDS software that serves as an electronic overlay on electronic
medical record systems. If a physician ignores CDS software without a meri-
torious reason, a patient may be at risk regardless of which type of software
is being used.
Unlike alert fatigue, the second public health concern with deregulating
CDS software concerns the effects of black-box medicine and use of algo-
rithms that may contain a large number of computations and correlations that
are not decipherable by any one group of clinicians.  These algorithmic, pre-
dictive relationships must be validated by software developers to assure that
clinicians use them safely and effectively.43  When the software compares a
“deidentified” patient’s data to evidence from clinical trials, studies, and
more, there are a multitude of issues that one cannot account for, issues
involving the individualized reactions of the patient, whether the patient fol-
lowed the treatment plan, and even what other medications a patient may be
taking.  The doctor who enters the patient’s data could introduce human er-
ror through incorrect inputs.  That issue is not as concerning since there are
ways to ensure data is entered correctly.
The larger concern, as mentioned above, is how to validate black-box
algorithms, especially when the algorithms are not based on just one or two
moving variables, but instead require a computer to analyze tens, hundreds,
or thousands of variables of unequal value.  Although the Cures Act does not
directly change governance of black-box algorithms because it applies to
41. Id. (citing Heleen van der Sijs et al., Overriding of Drug Safety Alerts in Computer-
ized Physicial Order Entry, 13 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 138 (2006), http://jamia.ox
fordjournals.org/content/jaminfo/13/2/138.full.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2016)).
42. See Interview with Easha Patel, Virginia Commonwealth University (2016) (Re-
garding the use of CDS in OB/GYN practice) (on file with author); see also Interview with
Vandan Patel, University of Michigan (Regarding the use of CDS in orthopedic surgery prac-
tice) (on file with author); See generally, ROBERT WACHTER, THE DIGITAL DOCTOR (2015).
43. W.  Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1401, 1416 (2016).
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technology where a healthcare professional can independently review con-
clusions, the technology is quickly moving to that point.  These algorithms
are called black-box algorithms specifically because the mechanisms and
bases for each decision may not be visible or even comprehensible to human
scientists.  These algorithms are difficult to implement in an evidence-based
medical community without more information about how each algorithm
works or some independent guarantee that the algorithm is truly effective.
Not validating black-box algorithms can be problematic for two rea-
sons.44  First, without validation, clinicians are not likely to trust the al-
gorithm and therefore not likely to use it, undermining incentives for
innovation. Second, although regulatory approval might signal validation to
clinicians even though they do not understand the algorithm themselves,
without some method of validation, regulating black-box algorithms be-
comes difficult.  Without regulation, there is no assurance of high quality,
making the algorithm unsafe for public use making it hazardous for clini-
cians who are concerned about liability to rely on it.  While there may be
private oversight, it can be difficult to coordinate considering how different
healthcare systems use different software and have varying standards.  The
creation of information about new medical technologies is itself a form of
innovation that must be protected through validation.45  As discussed in Part
IV, while there are other methods of validation outside of regulation, regula-
tory schemes often provide a stamp of approval while also aggregating infor-
mation that other forms of validation cannot.
B. Lack of Regulation as an Innovation Concern
While public health concerns surrounding CDS deregulation affect clini-
cians, and patients alike, firms are also impacted by deregulation.  At first
glance, deregulation of CDS software and black-box algorithms may seem to
open up the field of software and algorithms free of the burdens of regula-
tion.  A decrease in regulation is often cited as a factor in increasing innova-
tion; however, that may not be correct with regard to software and
algorithms for advanced healthcare.  Black-box medicine and even basic
prescription-based CDS software require substantial investments from
firms.46  Without regulation or intellectual property protection, there is a lack
of adequate incentive for firms to continue developing this kind of software,
especially when costs are likely to continue rising.47
44. Id. at 1416 n.70.
45. Id. at 1416 n. 71 (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation
Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007)).
46. Id. at 1408.
47. Id. at 1418 (stating that “[d]atabases, algorithms, and the knowledge that algorithms
are reliable are all information goods, which are difficult to keep exclusive once known. Ac-
cordingly, intellectual property—or a substitute incentive set—is likely necessary for its so-
cially optimal development.”).
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With the 21st Century Cures Act, regulation and regulatory exclusivity,
the only avenues available for full-fledged protection of CDS software (ba-
sic and black-box), are now gone.48 Patent exclusivity, as opposed to regula-
tion and regulatory exclusivity from the FDA, also does not exist for CDS
software and black-box algorithms.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in
Prometheus in 2012, patents are no longer a valid option to protect the intel-
lectual property behind algorithms based on diagnostic models.49  Black-box
algorithms and prescription suggestions arguably describe natural laws and
“tell[ ] doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activ-
ity.”50 Prometheus removed patent protection for a majority of medical di-
agnostic software and for similar innovations in the future, such as black-
box medicine, by entirely removing the technology from subject-matter eli-
gibility.  Even if subject-matter eligibility was not an issue, § 112’s require-
ments regarding enablement and written description also limit the
patentability of black-box algorithms (although those concerns may not be
as pervasive with the current, prescription-based CDS software).  As will be
discussed in Part IV, regulatory exclusivity through FDA jurisdiction over
CDS and black-box algorithms is the ideal way to provide protection for
software developers and incentivize innovation.  In fact, a lack of protections
is quite likely to decrease innovation in the long run.
IV. FDA REGULATION OF SOFTWARE: INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION
AND PROVIDING CONFIDENCE
A. Regulation to Address Public Health and Safety Concerns
Although the 21st Century Cures Act removes CDS software from the
FDA’s statutory jurisdiction, Part III acknowledges why this is a mistake.
Without regulation, clinicians are less likely to use CDS and black-box algo-
rithms, algorithms are not likely to be validated, and firms are unlikely to
continue developing algorithms without some level of incentive.  FDA regu-
lation through minimum safety standards for CDS software and a regime of
regulatory exclusivity would be a better option to address public health con-
cerns and ensure ongoing innovation.
Proponents of the 21st Century Cures Act argue that any public health
concerns are adequately addressed through an ‘escape hatch’ in the act, stat-
ing that the FDA may retain jurisdiction over software “reasonably likely to
48. While this paper only briefly talks about the lack of intellectual property incentives,
some authors have suggested trade secrecy may be a better option. For a discussion on why
trade secrecy specifically fails in the CDS and black-box algorithm field, see W. Nicholson
Price II, Patents, Big Data, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1433
(2016) (discussing how secrecy limits the value of black-box algorithms, which depends on
sharing information with others).
49. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012).
50. Id. at 79.
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have serious adverse health consequences.”51  There are two problems with
this reading of the statute.  First, there is no definition of what constitutes a
‘serious adverse health consequence,’ which continues to leave software de-
velopers in limbo regarding what level of FDA regulation firms should ex-
pect when developing software.  Without further guidance, the escape hatch
is vague and creates less incentive to learn about the health consequences of
the software.  Software developers are less likely to actively learn about the
health consequences of their software because knowing the consequences
would require disclosing the consequences, lengthening the approval pro-
cess.  Furthermore, the purpose of regulation requires the FDA to determine
what technology is likely to have adverse health consequences. Without
more regulation, however, the FDA is not likely to learn which technologies
would fall under such a label, because such information would largely come
from requiring companies to submit studies for approval.
Second, the escape hatch actually requires so much administrative
change that is it not likely to be effective in a timely manner.  The escape-
hatch provision actually states that to bring software back under FDA
regulation,
[T]he agency must ISSUE A FINAL ORDER IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER
providing its rationale based upon the potential for and severity of
patient harm if the software does not perform as intended, the extent
to which the software is intended to support the judgment of a
healthcare professional, whether a healthcare professional has a rea-
sonable opportunity to review the basis of the information or treat-
ment recommendation provided, and the intended user and use
environment.52
In order for the requisite changes to take place, the FDA will have to go
through a notice and comment procedure to reregulate certain types of
software, a process that could take at minimum a few months and is more
likely to actually take a few years.
Instead of dancing between regulating and not regulating CDS software,
it would be better if the FDA did regulate the software but ensured that the
regulations were tailored to carefully considered public safety issues and
providing temporary exclusivity for developers.  A trade-off between regula-
tion and exclusivity has worked well for the FDA in the past and would be
51. 21st Century Cures Act § 3060.
52. Jeffrey K. Shapiro & Jennifer D. Newberger, Highlights of Medical Device Related
Provision in the 21st Century Cures Act, FDA LAW BLOG (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.fdalaw-
blog.net/2016/12/highlights-of-medical-device-related-provision-in-the-21st-century-cures-
act/; see also id.
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ideal in the CDS context.53  Some clinicians worried about the public health
issues noted in Part III are already asking for more oversight, suggesting that
FDA involvement could “help reduce any real or perceived liability on the
part of vendors, purchasers, and users.”54  According to this same group of
physicians, “oversight can help protect patients by ensuring that systems are
of high quality and include approved parsimonious and tailored decision
support.”55
As mentioned above in Part III, alert fatigue is an important patient
safety concern that is not likely to be addressed without regulatory oversight.
The FDA is best positioned to address issues relating to patient safety, espe-
cially when such issues are a direct result of software constituting a medical
device.  A transnational example of a decrease in alert fatigue demonstrates
why. England’s Department of Health has already developed software de-
sign standards, including clinical decision support system standard, that are
mandatory for all software suppliers.56  While these standards are not strin-
gent to ensure malleability, the minimal standards ensure that patient protec-
tion is at the forefront of developing CDS software.57
The FDA also has the regulatory structure to ensure that developers and
firms train clinicians how to use CDS software in a safe manner.  Oversight
of manufacturer trainings, which has already worked in the past, is the best
way to ensure alert fatigue does not occur.  The FDA already has the infra-
structure to conduct such trainings since it does so with other medical de-
vices; furthermore, it has the proper incentives to continue the program,
incentives that are not motivated by profit.  User training can ensure that
physicians do not unreasonably ignore alerts.58  Currently, there is inade-
quate communication of system limitations and user error issues to physi-
cians, the individuals who depend on CDS software in making concrete
recommendations.  Removing FDA jurisdiction over CDS software and
black-box algorithms will only decrease any incentive to train users.  This
sort of FDA oversight would not require anything more than what the FDA
already does with regard to device manufacturers.  The FDA already man-
dates that device companies establish procedures to identify training needs
53. Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 327-29 (2015)
(listing multiple regimes of regulatory exclusivity, thirteen of which the FDA administers to
promote innovation).
54. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Clinical Decision Support Systems Could Be Modified
To Reduce ‘Alert Fatigue’ While Still Minimizing The Risk Of Litigation, 30 HEALTH AFF.
2310, 2311 (2011).
55. Id. at 2314.
56. Id. (citing Health Informatics - Application of clinical risk management to the man-
ufacture of health software, NAT’L Health SERV. CONNECTING FOR HEALTH (Apr. 2009), https:/
/web.archive.org/web/20130415060854/www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/
clinsafety/dscn/dscn14.pdf).
57. See id.
58. Id.
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and ensure personnel are appropriately trained to perform their assigned
tasks.59  The training must already be documented in records that can be
made available to FDA investigators upon request.60
B. Regulation to Address Diminishing Incentives to Innovate
As mentioned in Part III, another issue with deregulating CDS software
is that deregulation diminishes developers’ incentives to innovate in two
ways. First, regulation creates a demand for information that motivates in-
formation production, which is a form of innovation. The second is that reg-
ulatory approval enhances demand for a new technology, which makes it
more profitable, and thus stimulates innovation.  Similar to past actions by
the FDA, regulatory exclusivity provides incentives better tailored to
software and algorithms than other, traditional methods of intellectual prop-
erty protection.  The FDA would be the right agency to limit pre-market
approval of algorithms and software to competitors.61  Setting up a pre-mar-
ket approval regime would not only incentivize development, it would pro-
vide a method to ensure implementation of the above-mentioned safety
standards before software reached the market.
Regulatory exclusivity for predictive clinical software would not be sig-
nificantly different from existing preapproval regimes the FDA already has
in place.62  The FDA could withhold approving imitator products to market
and distribute similar software for a set amount of years.63  This withholding
would serve as a reward to the firm that initially invents the software while
encouraging competitors to make significant, positive changes to the
software either while waiting to gain approval or to make a completely new
product that would separately qualify for regulatory approval.  Unlike regu-
latory exclusivity periods for biologics, which last for four years of market
exclusivity and an additional eight years of data exclusivity,64 or even ge-
neric drugs, which last for five years,65 a two or three year term of exclusiv-
ity would probably suffice for CDS software.  Software is constantly
59. 21 C.F.R. § 820.25(b).
60. See Marie Dorat, Training and the FDA – What do They Require?, 360 FACTORS
(last visited Dec. 18, 2016) http://www.360factors.com/blog/training-and-the-fda-what-do-
they-require/.
61. See W. Nicholson Price II, Patents, Big Data, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016).
62. Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 302 (2015).
63. The author acknowledge that terms like “similar software” and “imitator products”
are loose terms that will also create uncertainty. The current suggestion is to preclude immedi-
ate approval of any other software that generates identical recommended courses of treatment;
however, firms could easily circumvent this by relying on a different algorithm.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012) (granting four years of market exclusivity and an
additional eight years of data exclusivity to biologics).
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012) (granting five years of market exclusivity for
new chemical entities).
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changing so long-term exclusivity would not be as beneficial here. Further-
more, once a hospital system adopts a specific software system for clinical
use, the hospital system is unlikely to immediately change to another
software system after two to three years.  Constant changes would require
hospitals to increase spending on a new product, increase costs for installa-
tion, and also require new trainings for physicians.  There is a built-in pre-
sumption that once a hospital buys a set of software products, they will
continue using that same system for as long as possible, especially if the
system comes with updates, as most CDS software does.66
Regulatory exclusivity would also be more flexible than any changes to
the patent process, which would require a drastic amount of work and would
not just affect software patents but all patentable subject matter.67  The FDA,
due to its mandate to protect innovation and the health and safety of patients,
would also have more experience with the specific technology behind CDS
software and black-box algorithms.68  Due to the FDA’s regulation of medi-
cal software as a medical device since the late 1980’s, the FDA is already
aware of the discrepancies noted in Part III regarding validation of software
and black-box medicine algorithms.  The FDA’s Sentinel database is evi-
dence of the FDA’s institutional knowledge regarding big data management
and the issues with validating any assumptions made through the use of such
data.  For 25 years now, the FDA has issued guidelines and regulations re-
garding software as medical devices.69  Regulatory exclusivity, which would
require software developers to hand over  treatment algorithms to the FDA
and show the basis for why the developer believes the algorithm is valid,
would provide more of a check on validation than complete deregulation
would.  Creating stronger guidelines and mechanisms for clinical validation
of algorithms, as opposed to no guidelines at all, would allow for clinical
validation, faith in the use of medical software and algorithms, and effective
innovation instead of innovation for the sake of innovation.
The only issue with regulatory exclusivity is one that the Court already
suggested through its holding in Prometheus.  If regulatory exclusivity pre-
vents other firms from relying on ‘natural’ laws to create medical software,
that sort of exclusivity could possibly decrease innovation by others; how-
ever, the use of regulatory exclusivity by the FDA with regards to biologics
and generics shows that a temporary period of exclusivity has only increased
incentives to innovate, not decreased such incentives.  While this solution is
66. The author notes that this suggests that a first-mover advantage may be enough to
capture the market, making regulatory exclusivity unnecessary. While that may be true, regula-
tory exclusivity also provides more confidence from investors in the market because it allows a
legal assertion of rights that a first-move may not always be able to access.
67. Price II, supra note 61, at 1446-47.
68. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA MISSION, http://www.fda.gov/About
FDA/WhatWeDo/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
69. See Murray, supra note 18.
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not perfect, it is better to protect innovation and patient safety than the der-
egulation proposed by the 21st Century Cures Act.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the purposes behind Congressional passage of the 21st Cen-
tury Cures Act, removing FDA jurisdiction over CDS software and black-
box algorithms is unlikely to incentivize innovation.  Regulatory exclusivity
grants from the FDA to innovative software developers would actually in-
centivize innovation.  Moreover, pre-approval regimes would ensure clini-
cians and physicians who use CDS software and black-box algorithms are
adequately trained and are only using software that has been validated with
sound, scientific principles.  Medical software is critical to advancing health-
care and providing the best possible patient outcomes. At least with regard to
the current state of medical software, the FDA is best equipped to ensure
safety and innovation in the field.
